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GAGAN GOEL∗ MOHAMMAD REZA KHANI† RENATO PAES LEME‡
Abstract
One of the major drawbacks of the celebrated VCG auction is its low
(or zero) revenue even when the agents have high value for the goods
and a competitive outcome would have generated a significant revenue. A
competitive outcome is one for which it is impossible for the seller and
a subset of buyers to ‘block’ the auction by defecting and negotiating
an outcome with higher payoffs for themselves. This corresponds to the
well-known concept of core in cooperative game theory.
In particular, VCG revenue is known to be not competitive when
the goods being sold have complementarities. Complementary goods are
present in many application domains including spectrum, procurement,
and ad auctions. The absence of good revenue from VCG auction poses
a real hurdle when trying to design auctions for these settings. Given the
importance of these application domains, researchers have looked for al-
ternate auction designs. One important research direction that has come
from this line of thinking is that of the design of core-selecting auctions
(See Ausubel and Milgrom, Day and Milgrom, Day and Cramton, Ausubel
and Baranov). Core-selecting auctions are combinatorial auctions whose
outcome implements competitive prices even when the goods are comple-
ments. While these auction designs have been implemented in practice
in various scenarios and are known for having good revenue properties,
they lack the desired incentive-compatibility property of the VCG auc-
tion. A bottleneck here is an impossibility result showing that there is no
auction that simultaneously achieves competitive prices (a core outcome)
and incentive-compatibility.
In this paper we try to overcome the above impossibility result by ask-
ing the following natural question: is it possible to design an incentive-
compatible auction whose revenue is comparable (even if less) to a compet-
itive outcome? Towards this, we define a notion of core-competitive auc-
tions. We say that an incentive-compatible auction is α-core-competitive
if its revenue is at least 1/α fraction of the minimum revenue of a core-
outcome. We study one of the most commonly occurring setting in Inter-
net advertisement with complementary goods, namely that of the Text-
and-Image setting. In this setting, there is an ad slot which can be filled
with either a single image ad or k text ads. We design an O(ln ln k)
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core-competitive randomized auction and an O(
√
ln(k)) competitive de-
terministic auction for the Text-and-Image setting. We also show that
both factors are tight.
1 Introduction
The VCG mechanism is a powerful mechanism that achieves an efficient outcome
in an incentive compatible manner for a variety of scenarios. The simplicity of
the VCG mechanism raised our hopes of wide application of this elegant theory
in practice. However, it has been noted in the recent past that the applicability
of VCG auction beyond the simple case of multiple homogeneous goods has
remained limited. Ausubel and Milgrom [AM02] offer an explanation of why
VCG in its purest form is often unsuitable to be used in practice. They write:
[...] higher revenues also improve efficiency, since auction rev-
enues can displace distortionary tax revenues. [...] Probably the
most important disadvantage of the Vickrey auction is that the rev-
enues it yields can be very low or zero, even when the items being
sold are quite valuable.
To illustrate this point of low or zero revenue, consider the following example
from spectrum auctions (taken from [AM02, AM06]): consider 3 bidders who
are participating in an auction for two spectrum licenses: the first bidder is
willing to pay 2 billion for the package of 2 licenses while each of the other two
bidders is willing to pay 2 billion for any individual license. The VCG outcome
allocates to the second and third bidder, and charges a payment of zero to each
of them. This is because the externality each winning bidder imposes on the
rest of the bidders is zero. Note that, one can hardly blame the lack of revenue
to the absence of competition; if one were to treat it as a market equilibrium
problem and compute market clearing prices (say by means of a tatonnement
procedure), the revenue would be non-trivial.
Thus, one natural question to ask is, for an auction outcome, how to formally
say that it achieves a competitive revenue? To answer this, [AM02] introduced
the notion of a core outcome in an auction setting. The notion of core is a
fundamental and well-known notion in cooperative game theory and represents
a way to share the utility produced by a group of players in a manner that
no sub-group of players would want to deviate. In an auction setting, a set of
winning buyers and their payments are said to be a core outcome if no sub-
group of losing bidders can propose to the auctioneer (seller) an alternative
higher-revenue outcome. For example, in the license example, the outcome
implemented by VCG is not in the core since the first bidder (who wanted
to purchase two licenses) could negotiate with the auctioneer that the licenses
should be allocated to him for any price larger than zero. On the other hand,
the outcome which allocates one license each to players 2 and 3 and charges each
of them 1 billion is in the core, since in this case there is no alternative outcome
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that the first player can propose to the auctioneer which would be beneficial for
both.
It is noteworthy that when the goods are substitute, the VCG outcome is
a core outcome, and VCG revenue equals the core-outcome with the minimum
revenue (the set of core outcomes is not unique) [AM02]. However, if the goods
are not substitutes, the VCG outcome may lie outside the core. In fact, as shown
in the above example, VCG revenue can be arbitrarily lower when compared to
the minimum-revenue core outcome.
So can one design incentive-compatible auctions whose outcome is always
in the core? Unfortunately, one can show that it is impossible to design an
auction that (a) achieves a core outcome, and (b) has truth-telling as a domi-
nant strategy equilibrium. So we must either relax (a) or (b). In Ausubel and
Milgrom [AM02], the authors relax (b), and give a family of ascending pack-
age auctions (called core-selecting auctions) which are not truthful but whose
equilibrium outcome is a core outcome. These auctions have been extremely
successful in practice – variations of these were used in spectrum-license auc-
tions in the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal, and Austria,
and in the auction of landing-slot rights in the three New York City airports.
See [DC12] for a complete discussion.
The focus of this paper is on applications in Internet ad auctions (we will call
them ad auctions from now on). There are several ad auction scenarios which
are modeled as goods with complementarities. As a case study for our work,
we use a very common scenario in ad auctions which has complementarities,
namely that of Text-and-Image ad auction. In a Text-and-Image ad auction
scenario an ad slot on a page can either accommodate k text ads (which are the
traditional ads displayed next to search results) or one large image-ad. Notice
that the example by Ausubel and Milgrom can be reproduced exactly in this
setting by setting k = 2.
What auction should we use for the Text-and-Image setting? The core-
selecting auction of [AM02] is not a good choice for this setting as the ascending
package auctions are interactive procedures in which bidders submit a sequence
of bids after provisional allocations and prices for the previous phase are re-
vealed; such designs often result in long and time-consuming procedures which
are justified for one-time spectrum auctions but unsuitable for Internet adver-
tisement1. Moreover, because of the fast-paced nature of online advertisement,
one cannot expect bidders to reach an equilibrium outcome for each individual
ad auction if the underlying auction is not a truthful one.
In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to design direct-revelation
incentive-compatible auctions whose revenue is competitive against a core out-
come (we call such auctions core-competitive auctions). In core-competitive auc-
tion design, we seek to relax (a) instead of (b) above. More precisely, we define
core revenue benchmark as the smallest revenue among all the core-outcomes.
1One can eliminate the interactive aspect of package bidding auction by using a proxy agent,
as Ausubel and Milgrom discuss in Section 3.4 of [AM02]. While this technique eliminates
the communication burden, it is not enough to achieve incentive-compatibility.
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We say that an auction is α-core-competitive if its revenue is at least an 1/α
fraction of the core revenue benchmark.
We formally define the notion of core-competitiveness in section 2, and later
we focus on the design of core-competitive auctions for the Text-and-Image set-
ting. We give a randomized universally-truthful mechanism which is O(ln ln k)-
core-competitive, where k is the number of slots. We also give a lower bound
showing that this factor is tight. We note that in ad auction settings, there are
several repeated auctions with each auction generating only a small revenue. For
such settings, a seller care about the overall performance and therefore random-
ized auctions are perfectly fine from a practical auction design perspective. We
also study deterministic auctions since for some settings randomization may not
be desired; for instance, for one time auctions like spectrum auctions. We give a
deterministic mechanism which is O(
√
ln(k))−core-competitive, and again show
that this factor is tight for deterministic mechanisms.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, the notion of core-competitiveness has
not been studied before. It is our belief that developing tools and techniques
for designing core-competitive auctions, and understanding the possibilities and
limitations of such auctions, will be very useful from a practical auction design
perspective.
1.1 Related Work
The line of inquiry that seeks to design package auctions that implement core
outcomes in equilibrium was started by Ausubel and Milgrom [AM02]. This
line has been further developed in [DM08, AB10, DC12, EK10, GL09, Lam10].
The authors design an iterative procedure that asks bidders in each round for
packages they want to bid on as well as bid values for each of those packages.
In each round a set of provisionally winning bids are identified. This proceeds
until no further bids are issued in a given round. Our work differs from this
line of work in the sense that we require incentive-compatibility; in the core-
selecting package auctions literature, the focus is on implementing core outcomes
in equilibrium.
Another stream of related work is the design of incentive compatible auc-
tions that tries to optimize for revenue in a prior-free setting. This research
direction was initiated in [GHW01, FGHK02, GH03] and resulted in a sequence
of followup results which are too large to survey here. We refer to Hartline’s
book [Har13] for a comprehensive discussion. The first successful results gave
auctions for the digital goods that approximate the F2 revenue benchmark, the
maximum revenue one can extract from at least two players using fixed prices.
More modern versions of this result [HY11, HH13, DHH13] compare against
the envy-free benchmark (how much revenue it is possible to extract from an
outcome where any two agents wouldn’t like to swap places). This resulted in
success stories for a large class of environments such as multi-units, matroids
and permutation environments. Our work differs from the above line of work as
we consider environments with complementarities, while the envy-free revenue
literature mostly focused on environments with substitutes. In Section 2.4 we
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discuss in detail the relation between the envy-free benchmark and the core-
revenue benchmark and we argue that the core-revenue benchmark captures
some of the no-envy notions.
Closer to our line of inquiry is the work of [MV07] and [AH06]. In [MV07],
they design revenue extraction mechanisms for general combinatorial auctions
where their benchmark is the maximum social welfare extractable from all ex-
cept one player (the one with the top bid). They use randomization to obtain
a mechanism with O(log n) approximation factor. They also give a match-
ing lower bound of Ω(logn) for randomized mechanisms, and for deterministic
mechanisms they give a lower bound of Ω(n). [AH06] study knapsack auction
where there are k identical items and each bidder demands a certain number
of them. Their benchmark is a version of envy-free pricing where a bidder has
to pay at least as much as the bidders with lower demands 2. They get an
approximation ratio of α ·OPT − λO(log log logn) where OPT is the optimal
envy-free revenue, α is a constant number and λ equals to the highest valuation
of any bidder. Although their approach is useful when λ is much smaller than
OPT; it performs poorly when λ is close to OPT which can be the case in the
Image-and-Text auction.
We note that the revenue benchmarks of both the above papers are stronger
than the core-benchmark. Thus, one might wonder if the mechanisms proposed
in [MV07] and [AH06] perform better against the core benchmark? However,
one can show that mechanisms given in both the above papers perform worse
than our mechanism when compared to the core benchmark. The mechanism
of [AH06] can perform arbitrarily bad compared to the core benchmark, and
the mechanism of [MV07] still gets only O(log n) using randomization when
compared to the core benchmark3. In some sense, this suggests that a too strong
benchmark that leads to large lower bounds in approximation ratio impedes the
design of a good revenue-maximizing mechanism. We believe that the core
benchmark is a more fundamental benchmark (as argued in series of papers
starting with the work of [AM06]), and as our work show, it looks amenable to
a good multiplicative approximation ratio.
Finally, while we focus on the forward setting (i.e. an auctioneer selling
goods to various buyers), there is a very extensive literature on the procure-
ment (reverse auction) version of this problem (i.e. a buyer purchasing goods
from various sellers). In this line of work, the goal is to design procurement auc-
tions where the total amount paid by the buyer approximates a certain frugality
benchmark. This line of work was initiated in [AT07] in which the frugality
benchmark is defined as the best solution after the agents in the optimal solu-
tion are removed. A more sophisticated frugality benchmark was introduced in
[KK05]. Their benchmark can be seen as the counterpart of the core-revenue
benchmark in procurement settings. Frugality in the procurement setting is also
a topic which is too broad to be completely covered here, but we mention a few
recent papers on the topic: [KSM10, CEGP09, EGG07, IKNS10].
2This is also called monotone benchmark, see also [LR12] and [BKK+13] for its definition
on digital goods auction.
3We refer to Section 2.4 for further discussion on this.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Core Outcomes
We consider set N = {1, . . . , n} of single-parameter agents with value vi for
being allocated and value zero otherwise. The set of feasible allocations is
specified by an environment, which is a collection of subsets of players that can
be simultaneously allocated F ⊆ 2N . We say that an environment is downward-
closed if every subset of a feasible set is also feasible, i.e., X ∈ F and Y ⊆ X
imply Y ∈ F .
An outcome in such environment is a pair (X, p) where X ∈ F corresponds
to the selected set of players and p ∈ RN is a vector of (possibly negative)
payments. Players have quasi-linear utility functions, i.e., ui(X, p) = vi − pi if
i ∈ X and ui(X, p) = −pi otherwise. We also define the utility of the auctioneer
as its revenue u0(X, p) =
∑n
i=1 pi.
Throughout this paper, given a vector v ∈ RN and S ⊆ N , we define
v(S) :=
∑
i∈S vi.
We can associate with the single parameter setting described above a coali-
tion value function w : 2N¯ → R+ (where N¯ = {0} ∪N) given by:
w(S) =
{
maxX∈F,X⊆S,p∈RN
+
∑
i∈S ui(X, p) 0 ∈ S
0 0 6∈ S
for every S ⊆ N¯ . The pair (N¯ , w) defines a cooperative game with trans-
ferable utility. The coalition value of a set corresponds to the total util-
ity that can be obtained by a certain set by defecting from the rest of the
agents. Clearly, a coalition that doesn’t contain the auctioneer can’t obtain
any value. A coalition containing the auctioneer can obtain utility equal to
maxX∈F,X⊆S,p∈RN
+
∑
i∈S ui(X, p) = maxX∈F,X⊆S v(X).
An imputation of utilities for a coalition S ⊆ N¯ corresponds to a vector of
utilities (ui)i∈S specifying how the coalition value is split between the agents,
in other words, a vector ui ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S and
∑
i∈S ui ≤ w(S). We say that an
imputation of utilities for N¯ is in the core if no coalition can defect and produce
an imputation of utilities that is better for all agents in the coalition. Formally:
Definition 1 (core) Given a cooperative game (N¯ , w) we define the core as
the following set of utility imputations:
Core(F, v) =
{
u ∈ RN¯+ ;
n∑
i=0
ui = w(N¯ ) and w(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
ui, ∀S ⊆ N¯
}
Notice that w(S) ≤ ∑i∈S ui is a necessary and sufficient condition for S
not wanting to defect. We say now that an outcome (X, p) is in the core if the
utilities produced are in Core(F, v). Precisely:
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Definition 2 (core outcomes) Given a single parameter setting F and val-
uation profile v, an outcome (X, p) is in the core if the vector of utilities is in
Core(F, v).
The following are important properties of core outcomes:
1. A core outcome is also a social welfare maximizing outcome, since∑
i∈X vi =
∑n
i=0 ui = w(N¯) = maxX∗∈F v(X
∗);
2. The core is always non-empty, since the following allocation is always in
the core: (X∗, p) where X∗ maximizes v(X) and pi = vi or i ∈ X∗ and
pi = 0 otherwise;
3. Given a utility imputation u ∈ Core(F, v), there is a core outcome that
realizes this vector: select a set X∗ ∈ F maximizing∑i∈X∗ vi and allocate
to X and charge prices pi = vi − ui for i ∈ X∗ and pi = 0 otherwise.
The outcome clearly realizes utilities for i ∈ X∗. For i /∈ X∗, notice that
w(N¯ ) =
∑n
i=0 ui = (u0+
∑
i∈X∗ ui+
∑
i∈N\X∗ ui) ≥ w(N¯ )+
∑
i∈N\X∗ ui.
So for all i ∈ N \X∗, ui = 0;
4. If the environment F is downward-closed, then for every u ∈ Core(F, v)
there is an outcome with non-negative payments that realizes it. The con-
struction is the same as in the previous item. Note that if F is downward
closed, X∗ \ i ∈ F for every i ∈ X∗, therefore: v(X∗) = u0 + u(X∗) ≥
ui + v(X
∗ \ i) so ui ≤ vi and hence pi = vi − ui ≥ 0.
The previous observations allow us to rephrase Definition 2 in a more direct
way. Notice that in the following definition, v(S \ X) ≤ p(X \ S) is a simple
rephrasing of the w(S) ≤∑i∈S ui condition.
Definition 3 (core outcomes - rephrased) Given a single parameter set-
ting F and valuation profile v, an outcome (X, p) is in the core if pi ≤ vi
for all i ∈ N and for all S ∈ F ,
v(S \X) ≤ p(X \ S)
Definition 3 allows for a natural interpretation of the core in auction settings.
If an outcome is not in the core, then there is a set S with v(S \ X) > p(X \
S), which means that agents in S \ X could come to the auctioneer and offer
him to evict agents X \ S and allocate to them instead, since they are able
to collectively pay the auctioneer more than the revenue he is getting from
X \ S. This characterizes core outcomes as outcomes for which no negotiation
is possible between the auctioneer and losing coalitions
2.2 Core-revenue benchmark
The discussion after Definition 3 shows that whenever an outcome is not in
the core, the auctioneer can potentially raise his revenue by negotiating with
losing coalitions. This suggests that the revenue of the core might be a natural
benchmark against which to compare. We define as follows:
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Definition 4 Given a single parameter setting F and a valuation profile v, we
define the core revenue benchmark as:
CoreRev(F, v) := min{u0|u ∈ Core(F, v)}.
Consider for example the case of multi-unit auctions, which can be modeled
by F = {X ⊆ N ; |X | ≤ k} for some fixed constant k < n and agents sorted
such that v1 > v2 > . . . > vn. It is straightforward from Definition 3 that an
outcome is in the core iff it allocates to X = {1, . . . , k} and if pi ≥ vk+1 for
i ∈ X . Notice that the revenue from core outcomes range from k · vk+1 all the
way to
∑k
i=1 vk. The core benchmark corresponds to the minimum revenue of
a core outcome, so for multi-unit auctions CoreRev(F, v) = k · vk+1.
It is not a coincidence that this is the same revenue as the VCG auction.
In fact, it is a well-known fact that the core revenue is always at least the
VCG revenue. This holds with equality when F is a matroid. For an in-depth
discussion on the relation between the VCG mechanism and the core we refer
the reader to Ausubel and Milgrom [AM02] and Day and Milgrom [DM08].
Lemma 1 ([AM02]) For any environment F and any valuation profile v, the
price paid by any agents in a core outcome is at least his VCG price. This
implies in particular that the core revenue benchmark is at least the revenue of
the VCG mechanism:
CoreRev(F, v) ≥ VcgRev(F, v) :=
∑
i∈X∗
[v(X∗−i)− v(X∗) + vi]
where X∗ = argmaxX∈F v(X) and X
∗
−i = argmaxX∈F,i/∈F v(X). Moreover, if F
is a matroid, the the above expression holds with equality.
Proof: If (X, p) is a core outcome, by the condition in Definition 3, v(X∗−i \
X∗) ≤ p(X∗ \X∗−i), which can be re-written as: v(X∗−i) − v(X∗) ≤ −[v(X∗ \
X∗−i)−p(X∗ \X∗−i)] ≤ vi−pi. So pi ≥ v(X∗−i)−v(X∗)+vi which is the revenue
that the VCG mechanism extracts from player i.
If F is a matroid, then for each i ∈ X∗, X∗−i is of the formX∗−i = X∗∪j\i and
therefore the VCG payments are given by pi = max{vj; j /∈ X∗;X∗∪ j \ i ∈ F}.
Now, we show that the VCG outcome is in the core: for any matroid basis
S ∈ F , there is a one-to-one mapping between σ : S \ X → X \ S such that
for i ∈ S with vi > 0, X ∪ i \ σ(i) ∈ F , therefore, pσ(i) ≤ vi. Summing this
inequality for all i ∈ S we obtain the core condition in Definition 3.
The previous lemma says that when there is substitutability among agents,
the core revenue benchmark is exactly the VCG revenue. When there are
complementarities, however, the core revenue benchmark can be arbitrarly
higher than the VCG revenue. Consider for example the famous example of
[AM02, AM06] in which there are 3 players and 2 items: the first player has a
valuation of 1 for the first item, the second player has a valuation of 1 for the
second item and the third player has a valuation of 1 for getting both items.
This example can be translated to our setting by taking the environment to
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be F = {∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}}. The VCG auction allocates X = {1, 2} and
charges zero payments. So, VcgRev(F, v) = 0. The core revenue, however, is
equal to one (CoreRev(F, v) = 1) since by taking the condition in Definition 3
with X = {1, 2} and S = {3}, we get: p1 + p2 ≥ v3 = 1.
2.3 Core competitive auctions
Our goal in this paper is to be able to truthfully extract revenue that is com-
petitive with the core-revenue benchmark. An auction for the single parameter
setting consists of two mappings: (i) allocation function, that maps a profile of
valuation functions to a distribution over allocations x : Rn+ → ∆(F ), where
∆(F ) denotes the set of probability distributions over F ; (ii) payment function,
that maps a profile of valuation functions to the expected payment of each agent:
p : Rn+ → RN+ .
We abuse notation and define the maps xi : R
N
+ → [0, 1] as the probability
of winning for player i, i.e., xi(v) = P[i ∈ X(v)]. A mechanism is said to
to be individually rational if for all profiles v, ui(v) = vixi(v) − pi(v) ≥ 0. A
mechanism is said to be incentive-compatible (a.k.a. truthful) if agents maximize
their utility by reporting their true value. In other words:
vixi(v)− pi(v) ≥ vixi(v′i, v−i)− pi(v′i, v−i) ∀v′i
The following lemma due to Myerson [Mye81] gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for an auction to be individually rational and incentive compatible:
Lemma 2 ([Mye81]) A mechanism defined by maps x and p is individually
rational and incentive compatible if: (i) for every i and fixed valuations v−i for
other players, vi 7→ xi(vi, v−i) is monotone non-decreasing; (ii) the payment
function is such that pi(vi) = vixi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(u, v−i)du.
Our goal in this paper is to study auctions whose revenue is competitive
with the core-revenue benchmark.
Definition 5 (core competitive auctions) We say that an auction defined
by x, p is α-core competitive if for every profile of valuation functions v ∈ RN+ ,∑
i
pi(v) ≥ α−1 · CoreRev(F, v).
2.4 Comparison with other benchmarks
A natural question at this point is how does the core benchmark compare with
other revenue benchmarks. Perhaps one of the closest benchmarks in this spirit
is the envy-free benchmark, which corresponds to the minimum revenue of an
allocation for which an agent would not want to trade positions with a dif-
ferent agent. This benchmark has been successfully used in various papers (
[GHK+05, HY11, HH13, DHH13] to cite a few) to design approximately-optimal
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revenue-extracting mechanisms. This benchmark, however, is very appropriate
for symmetric settings, i.e., a setting in which whenever an allocation is feasi-
ble, a similar allocation with the names of agents permuted is also feasible. For
asymmetric settings, however, it is not clear what the envy-freedom condition
means since some agents can’t be simply replaced by others. In an ad auction
where ads can be either texts (occupying one slot) or images (occupying mul-
tiple slots), it is not clear how to define what the envy of an image for a text
means, since the image is not able to replace a single text.
On the other hand, however, the core-revenue benchmark captures some
notion of “envy”, which is made explicit in Definition 3. One can think of the
inequality in the defintion as the “envy” of an allocated image for a group of
allocated text ads. Or more generaly, as the “envy” of a set of losing players for a
set of winning players that they can replace. What the core benchmark doesn’t
capture, however, is the “envy” from one allocated agent for another allocated
agents. For this reason, for symmetric settings, the envy free benchmark can
be arbitrarly higher than the core-revenue benchmark, which boils down to the
VCG revenue, as discussed in Section 2.1.
Another important benchmark against which to compare is the one intro-
duced by Micali and Valiant [MV07]. Given any feasiblity set, the authors
define as the maximum social welfare obtainable after the largest valued agent
is excluded. Formally:
MV(F, v) = max
X∈F,i∗ /∈X
v(X)
where i∗ is the agent with largest value4.
Lemma 3 For any environment F and any valuation profile v, the core revenue
benchmark is dominated by the Micali-Valiant benchmark:
MV(F, v) ≥ CoreRev(F, v).
Proof: Let (X, p) be the outcome of the VCG auction. Now, define p′ such that
p′i = vi if i ∈ X \ i∗, p′i∗ = pi∗ and p′i = 0 otherwise. First we show that (X, p′)
is in the core. Notice that if i∗ /∈ X , then p′(X \ S) = v(X \ S) ≥ v(S \ X)
so clearly (X, p′) is in the core. If i∗ ∈ X , then p′i∗ = v(X−i∗) − v(X \ i∗)
where X−i∗ is the allocation with X ∈ F, i∗ /∈ X maximizing v(·). Therefore
p(X) = v(X \ i∗) + p′i∗ = v(X−i∗) therefore, p(X \ S) = v(X−i∗)− p(X ∩ S) ≥
v(S) − v(X \ S) = v(S \ X). Finally, notice that CoreRev(F, v) ≤ p′(X) =
MV(F, v).
Micali and Valiant [MV07] give an individually rational and incentive com-
patible randomized mechanism whose revenue is an O(log n) approximation of
MV(F, v) and that such approximation factor is tight. This directly translates
in a same factor approximation for the core-revenue benchmark. They also show
that no deterministic auction can approximate MV(F, v) by a factor better then
Ω(n).
4The benchmark of [MV07] is defined for a generic multi-parameter setting. For the expo-
sition, we specialize it for the single-parameter setting we are studying.
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One reason for which it is hard to improve the MV-benchmark even for very
simple settings, MV is too stringent: for example, for the digital goods setting
F = 2N , MV(F, v) =
∑
i vi−maxi vi. Indeed, both lower bounds in [MV07] are
given for the digital goods setting. For this setting, the core-revenue benchmark
is zero, since there is no natural competition among the agents.
We believe that the core revenue benchmark provides a more achievable
goal and therefore a more likely avenue for improvement for particular settings.
For the Text-and-Image setting, for example, the lower bounds of [MV07] imply
that no mechanism can approximate the MV-benchmark by a better factor then
Ω(log k) for randomized mechanisms and Ω(k) for deterministic mechanisms.
For the CoreRev-benchmark, however, we are able to obtain O(ln ln k) and
O(
√
ln(k)) respectively.
The core revenue also has the important property of disentangling the prob-
lems of achieving high revenue for setting with substitutes and for settings with
complements, since the former becomes trivial under the CoreRev-benchmark
while the latter is quite challenging. Under the MV-benchmark, both substi-
tutes and complements are challenging.
3 O(
√
ln(k))-core-competitive auction for Text-
and-Image setting
3.1 Text-and-Image Setting
Consider k advertisement slots and n bidders. Each bidder either corresponds to
a text ad, which demands one slot to be displayed, or an image, which demands
all k slots. It is public information that whether each bidder is a text or an
image. Each bidder’s value for being displayed is given by vTi for text ads and
vIi for image ads. The values are private information of the bidders.
Let nT and nI be the number of text and image ads respectively. We assume
w.l.o.g. that nT ≥ k+1 and nI ≥ 2 (adding a few extra bidders with value zero
if necessary). We also assume that the indices of the players are sorted such
that valuations of text ads are vT1 ≥ vT2 ≥ . . . ≥ vTnT and valuations of image ads
are vI1 ≥ vI2 ≥ . . . ≥ vInI . For convenience, we define the maximum extractable
revenue of text ads as:
ΦT := max
j∈{1..k}
j · vTj
We will also denote the k-th harmonic partial sum by Hk =
∑k
j=1
1
j = O(ln k).
It is a well known fact that
ΦT ≥ 1Hk
k∑
j=1
vTj , (1)
since j · vTj ≤ ΦT for all j, so 1jΦT ≥ vTj . We finish the argument by summing
the previous inequality for all j = 1..k.
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3.2 A deterministic core-competitive auction
We start by presenting a O(
√
ln(k))-core competitive deterministic auction. We
will use this mechanism as a building block for the more complicated randomized
mechanism given in Section 4. As a first step, we provide a characterization of
the core-revenue in that setting:
Lemma 4 Given a Text-and-Image setting, if the highest value feasible set con-
sists of text ads (
∑k
i=1 v
T
i ≥ vI1) then CoreRev(F, v) = max{kvTk+1, vI1}. If
the highest value feasible set consists of an image ad, then CoreRev(F, v) =
max{vI2 ,
∑k
i=1 v
T
i }.
Proof: Note that in Text-and-Image setting the winner set cannot contain both
text and image ads. Now consider the special case where
∑k
i=1 v
T
i = v
I
1 . In this
case no matter from which group is the winning set, the sum of payments has
to be at least
∑k
i=1 v
T
i = v
I
1 . Because if the sum of payments is less, then
the non-winning group can offer more to the auctioneer and all of them benefit
more.
Now consider the case where
∑k
i=1 v
T
i > v
I
1 . In this case the winners are the
first k text ads with sum of valuations
∑k
i=1 v
T
i . In order to be a core outcome,
the sum of payments of the winners has to be more than valuations of image
ads and hence more than vI1 . The payment of each winner also has to be more
than the valuation of the highest text ad who is not in the winning set which
is vTk+1. Therefore, the sum of payments of the winners has to be more than
k · vTk+1. We conclude for this case that CoreRev(F, v) = max{kvTk+1, vT1 }.
Now consider the case where
∑k
i=1 v
T
i < v
I
1 . In this case, the winner is an
image ad with value vI1 . In order to be a core outcome, the payment of the winner
has to be at least the value of the second best image ad which is vI2 . The payment
of the winner also has to be more than the sum of valuations of the highest k text
ads which is
∑k
i=1 v
T
i . We conclude that CoreRev(F, v) = max{vI2 ,
∑k
i=1 v
T
i }.
Recall the example by Ausubel and Milgrom discussed in the introduction:
if we have two text ads and one image ad all with value 1, the text ads are
selected and their payment is zero. The reason for that is that if any text ad
decreases his value all the way to ǫ > 0, the text ads are still selected. One
way to get around this problem is picking the allocated set in such a way that a
decrease in value for any given text significantly decreases the likelihood of the
entire set being picked.
A natural way to do so is to allocate to the set which has the potential of
generating the largest revenue. One proxy for that is the maximum extractable
revenue ΦT which corresponds to the maximum revenue you can extract by
setting a uniform price. This motivates the mechanism that allocates to the
highest value image ad if vI1 ≥ ΦT and otherwise allocates to the j highest text
ads where j is the maximum index such that jvTj ≤ vI1 . Here the payments are
according to critical prices.
In the Ausubel and Milgrom example, for instance, the text ads are still allo-
cated but their threshold is now 12 , so their total revenue is 1. This mechanism
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is clearly truthful since the allocation is monotone and its revenue is clearly
an improvement over VCG. The gap between its revenue and the core-revenue
benchmark can be as bad as O(ln k). Consider the following example: one
image ad with value Hk and k text ads with value 1/i for i = 1, . . . , k. The
core-benchmark is Hk but the revenue of the mechanism is only ΦT = 1.
A way to improve this mechanism is to increase the weight attributed to the
text ads by a factor of
√
ln(k). Now, we are ready to define our mechanism:
Allocation rule: If vI1 ≥ ΦT ·
√
ln(k) then allocate to the highest value
image ad. Otherwise, allocate to the j text ads with largest values where j
is the largest j ≤ k such that j · vTj ≥ vI1/
√
ln(k).
Pricing rule: Allocated bidders are charged according to critical val-
ues.
Lemma 5 In the deterministic Text-and-Image mechanism, if the first image
ad wins, her critical value is max{vI2 ,ΦT ·
√
ln(k)}. If a set of j text ads win,
their critical value is max{vTk+1, vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k))}.
Proof: Recall that the critical value of each winner is the minimum bid for
which she remains a winner fixing the other bidders’ bids.
The case where the winner is an image ad is easy to proof. Note that in this
case the winner has value vI1 . The minimum bid in order to remain the winner
has to be at least the value of the second highest image ad which is vI2 and has
to be larger than ΦT ·√ln(k) to win against text ads. Therefore, the critical
value of the winner is max{vI2 ,ΦT ·
√
ln(k)}.
Now we consider the case where the winners are the j highest text ads. If
max{vTk+1, vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k))} is equal to vTk+1, we have vI1/
√
ln(k) ≤ k ·vTk+1 hence
j = k by the way we select j. Hence, the first k text ads win. Moreover, the
winners’ payments has to be at least vTk+1 in order to be in the first k text ads,
therefore, the critical value of the winners is max{vTk+1, vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k))} = vTk+1.
If max{vTk+1, vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k))} is equal to vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k)), we prove by con-
tradiction that the critical value of winners is vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k)). Lets assume that
there exist value v′ (v′ < vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k))) such that if a winner (W) bids v′,
she remains in the winning set and hence v′ is her critical value. Let j′ be the
number of winners when W bids v′. We know that the value of ΦT is at most
j′ · v′ since W is in the winning set. The value of ΦT has to be greater than
vI1/
√
ln(k) in order for text ads to win against image ads. Therefore, we have
j′ · v′ ≥ vI1/
√
ln(k). On the other hand we have v′ < vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k)) which
implies j · v′ < vI1/
√
ln(k). Hence we conclude that j′ > j which contradicts
with the fact that j is the largest number such that j ≤ k and j · vj is larger
than or equal to
vI1√
ln(k)
.
Using the previous two lemmas we prove the following theorem and finish
this section.
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Theorem 1 The deterministic Text-and-Image mechanism is O(
√
ln(k))-core
competitive.
Proof: We prove the theorem by considering two cases: Case (i) when the first
image ad wins and Case (ii) when the first j text ads win.
In Case (i) the winner is the image ad with value vI1 and his payment
max{vI2 ,ΦT ·
√
ln(k)} by Lemma 5 is the revenue of our deterministic Text-
and-Image mechanism. The value of CoreRev in this case is max{vI2 ,
∑k
i=1 v
T
i }
by Lemma 4. Therefore, using Equation 1 we conclude that the revenue of our
deterministic Text-and-Image mechanism is at least
√
ln(k) fraction of CoreRev.
In Case (ii) the winners are the first j text ads. By Lemma 5 we know that
their critical value is max{vTk+1, vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k))}. If their critical value is equal
to vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k)) then the total revenue of the mechanism is vI1/
√
ln(k). If their
critical value is equal to vTk+1 then it means that v
T
k+1 ≥ vI1/(j ·
√
ln(k)), hence
j is equal to k since j is the largest j ≤ k such that j · vTj ≥ vI1/
√
ln(k). There-
fore, the total revenue is k · vTk+1. As a result the total revenue in Case (ii) is
max{vI1/
√
ln(k), k · vTk+1}. The value of CoreRev in this case is max{kvTk+1, vI1}
by Lemma 4. Therefore the revenue of our deterministic Text-and-Image mech-
anism is at least
√
ln(k) fraction of CoreRev.
3.3 A O(
√
ln(k)) lower bound for deterministic mecha-
nisms
Now we show that O(
√
ln(k)) is necessary for deterministic core-competitive
mechanisms. Formally, we show that no mechanism that is anonymous and sat-
isfies independence of irrelevant alternatives can provide an approximation ratio
better then O(
√
ln(k)). A word of caution: while anonymity and independence
of irrelevant alternatives are commonly used assumptions in lower bounds for
deterministic mechanisms [ADL12], they are not completely innocuous as shown
by [AFG+11].
Definition 6 A mechanism (M = (x, p)) is anonymous if the following holds.
Let v and v′ be two valuation profiles that are permutations of each other (i.e.
the set of valuations are the same but the identities of bidders are permuted). Say
v = permutation(v′). If x(v) = S1 and x(v
′) = S′, then S′ = permutation(S).
Definition 7 A mechanism (M = (x, p)) satisfies independence of irrelevant
alternatives if we decrease the bid of a losing participant, it does not hurt any
winner. More formally, for every valuation profile v and loser participant i 6∈
x(v), if we decrease the value of i from vTi to vˆi
T < vi then x(v) ⊆ x(vˆiT , v−i).
Theorem 2 Let M∗ be a deterministic mechanism with optimum core com-
petitive factor satisfying anonymity and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Then there exist a valuation profile for which revenue of M∗ is at most
√
ln(k)
of CoreRev.
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Proof: Let valuation profile v consists of k text ads {vT1 , vT2 , . . . vTk } where value
vTi is equal to 1/i and 2 image ads {vI1 , vI2} both with value
√
ln(k). Now we
consider two cases:
Case (i) M∗ allocates to an image ad. Note that the revenue of M∗
is the payment of the winner and is at most
√
ln(k). Now, lets increase the
valuation of the winner to ln(k) and build a new valuation profile v′. Note
that by Lemma 2 the winner and his payment in v′ remains the same as in
v. Therefore, the revenue of v′ is
√
ln(k) while its CoreRev by Lemma 4 is ln(k).
Case (ii) M∗ allocates to a set of text ads . We build a group of
k valuation profiles v(1), . . . , v(k) and show that in at least one of them the
difference between CoreRev and revenue ofM∗ is√ln(k). valuation profile v(1)
is the same as v and we build v(i+1) from v(i) by the following procedure. If
text ad vTi+1 is a winner in v
(i) then we obtain v(i+1) by increasing value of vTi+1
to one in v(i). Otherwise, if text ad vTi+1 is a loser in v
(i) then we obtain v(i+1)
by decreasing value of vTi+1 to zero in v
(i).
Let j be the largest number such that j ≤ k and text ad vTj is a winner
in v(j). Now we claim that every text ad j′ where j′ > j is a loser in v(j).
Otherwise, if such j′ exist then j′ will also be a winner in v(j
′) since by
independence of irrelevant alternative j′ remains a winner in all valuation
profiles v(ℓ) for j < ℓ < j′. This contradicts with the fact that j is the largest
number. Therefore, we know that in valuation profile v(j) all the winners
are between 1 and j and hence we have at most j winners. Note that v(j) is
obtained from v(j−1) by increasing the value of vTj from 1/j to 1 and by Lemma
2 his payment is at most 1/j. Also, all the winners in v(j) have valuation 1, so
we claim that all the winners should pay the same amount. Before proving the
claim, we show that this is enough to finishes the proof in this case. Mechanism
M∗ at valuation profile v(j) has at most j winners each paying at most 1/j,
therefore, the revenue ofM∗ is 1 while CoreRev of v(j) is√ln(k) (by Lemma 4).
We finish this section by proving the claim that the payments of winners
of M∗ at valuation profile v(j) are all the same. Assume otherwise and let a
and b be two text ads in the valuation profile v where both are winners but
they pay different amounts. w.l.o.g. assume pa < pb. Lets pick value x such
that pa < x < pb and x be different than all the valuations in v
(j). Note that
such x exists since there are finite number of bidders in v(j) but infinitely many
numbers in range (pa, pb). Now if we decrease the valuation of bidder v
T
a from
1 to x and obtain valuation profile A she remains a winner by Lemma 2. If we
decrease the valuation of bidder vTb from 1 to x and obtain valuation profile B
she does not remain a winner by Lemma 2. Note that the single bidder in A
with valuation x is a winner but the single bidder with valuation x in B is not
a winner while A and B are permutations of each other. This contradicts with
anonymity (see Definition 7) of M∗.
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4 A randomized O(ln(ln(k)))-core competitive
mechanism
In this section we improve the O(
√
ln(k))-core competitive mechanism presented
in the last section with the use of randomization. Recall that in the deterministic
mechanism we decide on allocating to text or image ads based on the ratio vI1/Φ
T
being above or below
√
ln(k). If we allow randomness, we can decide a threshold
as a random function of this ratio. Optimizing the revenue as a function of this
distribution, we obtain the following mechanism:
Allocation rule: Consider the ration ψ = vI1/Φ
T :
⋆ if ψ ≤ 2 allocate the items to the j largest text ads, where j is the
largest number such that jvTj ≥ vI1/2.
⋆ if 2 < ψ, allocate to the highest valued image ad with probability
min{1, ln(ψ)/ ln(ln k)}. With the remaining probability, leave the
items unallocated.
Pricing rule: Allocated bidders are charged according to Myerson’s
integral.
In the following lemma we calculate the critical values of winners and total
revenue of our randomized mechanism.
Lemma 6 The revenue of our mechanism is the following.
∑
i
pi(v) =


max{k · vTk+1, vI1/2} case (i): ψ < 2
(vI1 + 2Φ
T ln(2)− 2ΦT )/ ln(ln(k)) case (ii): 2 ≤ ψ ≤ ln(k)
(ln(k) · ΦT + 2ΦT ln(2)− 2ΦT )/ ln(ln(k)) case (iii): ψ > ln(k)
Proof: We consider the following three cases.
Case (i). In this case we have j text winners. We prove that the critical
value of each of them is at least vI1/(2j). Suppose not and assume that the
critical value of text ad A is v′A where v
′
A < v
I
1/(2j). This means that when
A bids v′A she still remains a winner. Therefore, there exists a number j
′ such
that
j′ · v′A > vI1/2 (2)
in order for text ads to win against image ads. Using v′A < v
I
1/(2j) and
Equation 2 we conclude that j′ > j which contradicts with the fact that j
is the largest number that jvTj > v
I
1/2. Therefore the critical value of each
of the j text winners is at least vI1/(2j). Moreover if kv
T
k > v
I
1/2 then each
winner’s critical value must be more than vTk+1 in order to be in the winning
set. Therefore, the critical value of the winners is equals to max{vTk+1, vI1/(2j)}
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and the total revenue in this case is max{k · vTk+1, vI1/2}.
Case (ii). In this case the image ad with largest valuation vI1 wins and his
expected payment is the expected total revenue of our mechanism.
p(vI1) = v
I
1x
I
1(v
I
1 , v−1)−
∫ vI1
2ΦT
xI1(u, v−1)du Lemma 2
= vI1 ln(v
I
1/Φ
T )/ ln(ln(k))−
∫ vI1
2ΦT
ln(u/ΦT )/ ln ln(k)du replacingxI1
= vI1 ln(v
I
1/Φ
T )/ ln(ln(k))− [(u · ln(u/ΦT )− u)/ ln(ln(k))]vI1
2ΦT
solving the integral
= (vI1 + 2Φ
T ln(2)− 2ΦT )/ ln(ln(k))
Case (iii). Note that if vI1 is larger than ln(k) ·ΦT then her probability of
winning is one. Therefore, his payment will be the same as when her valuation
is ln(k) · ΦT . Therefore, using case (ii) the payment vI1 in this case is (ln(k) ·
ΦT + 2ΦT ln(2)− 2ΦT )/ ln(ln(k)).
Theorem 3 Core competitive factor of randomized Image-and-Text mechanism
is max{2, 1.43 · ln(ln(k))}.
Proof: We prove the theorem by considering three cases similar to Lemma 6.
Case (i) : ψ < 2. By Lemma 4 we know that if
∑k
1 v
T
i ≥ vI1 then
CoreRev is equal to max{kvTk+1, vI1}. As the revenue of our mechanism in this
case is max{k · vTk+1, vI1/2} (by Lemma 6) the proof of the lemma follows. If∑k
1 v
T
i < v
I
1 then by Lemma 4 we know that CoreRev = max{vI2 ,
∑k
i=1 v
T
i }
which is at most vI1 . Therefore, the core competitive factor for this case is 2
and the proof of the lemma follows.
Case (ii) : 2 ≤ ψ ≤ ln(k). By Lemma 4 we know that if ∑k1 vTi ≥ vI1
then CoreRev is equal to max{kvTk+1, vI1}. As ΦT ≥ kvTk+1 and vI1 ≥ 2ΦT ,
we conclude that CoreRev is at most vI1 . If
∑k
1 v
T
i < v
I
1 then by Lemma 4
we know that CoreRev = max{vI2 ,
∑k
i=1 v
T
i } which is at most vI1 . Therefore,
in this case CoreRev is at most vI1 . The revenue of our mechanism in
this case is (vI1 + 2Φ
T ln(2) − 2ΦT )/ ln(ln(k)) ≃ (vI1 − 0.61ΦT )/ ln(ln(k))
(by Lemma 6). As vI1 ≥ 2ΦT , the revenue of our mechanism is at
least (vI1 − 0.61vI1/2)/ ln(ln(k)) = 0.695vI1/ ln(ln(k)), hence it is at least
0.695/ ln(ln(k)) fraction of CoreRev (i.e. 1.43 · ln(ln(k))-core competitive) and
the proof of the lemma follows.
Case (iii): ψ > ln(k). In this case we have vI1 > ln(k) ·ΦT which by Equa-
tion 1 implies vI1 ≥
∑k
1 v
T
i . Hence the CoreRev in this case is max{vI2 ,
∑k
i=1 v
T
i }
which is at most vI1 . The rest of the proof is similar to case (ii) and the core
competitive factor for this case is at least 1.43 · ln(ln(k)).
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5 A Lower Bound for Revenue of Randomized
Mechanisms in Image-and-Text setting
In this section we prove lower bound of Ω(ln(ln(k))) for core-competitive factor
of randomized mechanisms. The structure of the proof is as follows. Let assume
R∗ = (x∗, p∗) to be a truthful randomized mechanism (satisfying conditions of
Lemma 2) with optimum core-competitive factor. We derive a distribution
over valuation profiles for the Text-and-Image setting such that the expected
revenue of R∗ is at most 2 and the expected value of CoreRev is Ω(ln(ln(k))).
Therefore, we conclude that for at least one of the valuation profiles in the
support of α, R∗ yields a revenue that is smaller than core revenue by factor
Ω(ln(ln(k))).
A distribution over valuation profiles. Given k text ads and one
image ad, define a distribution D over valuation profiles as the following. The
value of each text ad is taking iid from the set {1, 12 , . . . , 1k}, each element has
probability 1k . The value of the image ad is taken from set {H, H2 , . . . , HH } were
each element has probability 1H , where H = ⌈Hk⌉.
In the following lemma we prove that the expected revenue of R∗ is at most
2.
Lemma 7 The expected revenue of R∗ for α is at most 2.
Proof: From the perspective of any given player, a randomized mechanism can
be seen as a random threshold being offered to i as a function of v−i. So the
revenue that can be extracted from each agent i in expectation, is the revenue
that can be extracted from i by using a random threshold, which is the maximum
revenue that can be obtained from any given player by a fixed threshold (since
the revenue from a random threshold is the expectation of revenue that can be
obtained from a fixed threshold)5.
It is simple to see that under D the best revenue that can be obtained by
a single threshold from any given text ad is 1/k and the revenue that can be
obtained from an image is 1. So, the total revenue is at most k · 1k + 1 = 2.
Lemma 8 The expected value of the core revenue benchmark is doubly-
logarithmic: Ev∼DCoreRev(v) ≥ Ω(ln(ln(k))).
5Here is a simple mathematical derivation of those arguments for differentiable allocation
function x(v) (since monotone functions are almost-everywhere differentiable, the same argu-
ment can be easily extended just by performing the equivalent calculations on discontinuities)
given an allocation x(x), let xˆ(vi) = Ev−ix(vi, v−i), then the expected revenue that can be
extracted from agent i with distribution F is given by pi = Evi [
∫
vi
0
u · ∂xˆ(u)du =
∫∞
0
∫
vi
0
u ·
∂xˆ(u)dudF (v). Inverting the order of the integration we get: pi =
∫∞
0
∫∞
u
u ·∂xˆ(u)dF (v)du =∫∞
0
u · ∂xˆ(u)(1− F (u))du ≤ maxu[u · (1− F (u))] ·
∫∞
0
∂xˆ(u)du ≤ maxu[u · (1−F (u))], which
is the maximum revenue obtained from a single threshold.
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Proof: Throughout this proof, let v be a random variable drawn from D. For
any given text ad, E[vTi ] = Hk/k. Now, we bounds its variance by:
Var[vTi ] = E[(v
T
i )
2]−E[vTi ]2 ≤ E[(vTi )2] =
1
k
k∑
j=1
1
j2
≤ π
2
6 · k ≤
2
k
.
Therefore, E[
∑
i v
T
i ] = ⌈Hk⌉ and Var[
∑
i v
T
i ] ≤ 2. By Chebyshev’s inequality
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
vTi −Hk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2
)
≤ 1
2
.
By Lemma 4 we know that the CoreRev(v) = min{∑i vTi , vI}. Now, we are
ready to lower bound the core revenue benchmark:
E[CoreRev(v)] = E
[
min
(∑
i v
T
i , v
I
)]
≥ 1
2
· E [min (H − 2, vI)] by Chebyshev’s inequality
≥ 1
2
· 1
H
H∑
i=1
min
(
H − 2, H
i
)
replacing vI
= Ω(logH)
Since H = O(log k) we get that E[CoreRev(v)] ≥ Ω(ln(ln(k))).
Theorem 4 The core-competitive factor of R∗ is at least Ω(ln(ln(k))).
Proof: Since E[CoreRev(v)] = Ω(ln(ln(k))) and E[
∑
i pi(v)] = O(1), it follows
from the probabilistic methods that there must be at least one valuation profile
for which CoreRev(v) ≥ Ω(ln(ln(k))) · E[∑i pi(v)].
Note on inefficient allocations: The auctions described in this paper imple-
ment outcomes that are often not socially optimal. Moreover, even when more
then one socially optimal allocation is available, the mechanism might allocate
to an agent that is part of no efficient allocation. This is unlike, for example, the
Micali-Valiant mechanism [MV07] which always allocates to a (random) subset
of the agents allocated by the VCG mechanism. Next we show that sometimes
allocating to agents which are not allocated in any efficient outcome is necessary
in order to get core-competitiveness better then O(ln k).
Theorem 5 Any mechanism for the Text-and-Image setting that only allocates
for a subset of the agents selected by the VCG mechanism has Ω(ln k) core
competitive hardness.
Proof: Consider k text ads with vTi drawn from the same distribution used
for the previous lower bound and one image ad with vI1 = Hk/2. Using the
expectation and variance of
∑
i v
T
i computed earlier in this section, we know
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by Chebyshev’s inequality that Pr(|∑ |ivTi −Hk| > Hk/s) ≤ Ω(1/H2k). So the
image ad is allocated with probability O(1/H2k). Since the revenue obtained
from any given text ad in expectation is at most 1/k (by Lemma 7), the total
revenue is at most k · 1k + O( 1H2
k
) · Hk/2 = O(1). The expected core revenue
benchmark, however, is at least (1 − 1
H2
k
) · Hk/2 = Ω(ln k).
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